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COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
CENTURY PARK OFFICES, LTD., 
Plaintiff and Appellee, REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. BIRELEY, Case No. 900292-CA 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPEAL FROM FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court specifically acknowledged in its Memorandum 
Decision that it relied on an examination of the default provi-
sion in the lease and the Notice itself in reaching its conclu-
sion that the Notice did not constitute an election of remedies. 
The trial court did not resort to extrinsic evidence as to 
Century Park's intent because there was none presented at trial. 
The question before the court was one of document interpretation. 
Therefore, the court's decision was a conclusion of law rather 
than a finding of fact. It should be reviewed for correctness. 
It is a question of law for this Court to determine whether the 
Notice to Pay or Quit constituted an election of remedies and a 
termination of the lease absent any testimony whatsoever regard-
ing either party's intent. 
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The distinctions Century Park has drawn between the unlawful 
detainer statutes of Utah and Colorado, in an attempt to distin-
guish Colorado case law directly on point, are meaningless. 
There is little basis for the proposition that the Colorado court 
formulated its rule solely on the basis of the unlawful detainer 
statute. Furthermore, both Utah and Colorado statutes speak in 
terms of a "forfeiture." Utah should follow other jurisdictions 
which have considered the issue now before this Court and hold 
that a Notice to Pay Rent or Quit constitutes an election by the 
landlord to terminate the lease. Bireley should be held liable 
for rent only through the date he quit the premises upon receipt 
of said notice. Clear language is required to preserve the right 
of the landlord to continue to recover rent under a lease after a 
Notice to Pay Rent or Quit has been served upon the tenant. 
Finally, if a landlord is to continue to hold a tenant 
liable under the lease, he must do so essentially as the tenant's 
agent. The tenant retains a possessory right subject only to the 
landlord's reasonable mitigation efforts. Here, Century Park 
simply took back the premises and relet them directly without 
regard to any rights of Bireley. Further, Century Park gave 
Bireley no written indication whatever, including the pleadings 
in this case, that it intended to continue to hold Bireley 
responsible for rent after he vacated the premises pursuant to 
the Notice to Pay or Quit. Consequently, any discussion 
regarding mitigation efforts are misplaced under the facts of 
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this case. Because the evidence at trial indicates Century Park 
never gave any consideration to Bireley in exchange for a promise 
to continue to pay rent for the duration of the lease term, there 
is no basis for any finding that the lease was enforceable beyond 
the election to terminate in November 1987. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION, WITH RESPECT TO 
CENTURY PARK'S INTENT IN SERVING THE NOTICE 
TO PAY RENT OR QUIT, WAS A CONCLUSION OF LAW 
TO BE REVIEWED UNDER A CORRECTION OF ERROR 
STANDARD. 
Century Park argues that this case should be reviewed under 
the "clearly erroneous" standard set out in Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a). That rule provides: "Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." But the trial court's decision with respect to 
Century Park's intent in serving the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit 
was not a finding of fact, but rather, a conclusion of law based 
upon an interpretation of the documents involved, without resort 
to extrinsic evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that the labels 
attached to findings of fact or conclusions of law are not deter-
minative. Specifically, in Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National 
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Am. Title Ins, Co., 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
Questions of contract interpretation not requiring 
resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on 
such questions we accord the trial court's interpreta-
tion no presumption of correctness. 
[W]e have determined that the trial court's finding of 
an agreement to pay fees was, in fact, a legal con-
clusion based on its interpretation of a provision in 
the insurance policy. . . . It is fair to say that a 
finding of fact that is actually a conclusion of law 
will be treated as a conclusion of law . . . As noted 
above, a conclusion of law is reviewed for correctness. 
Id. at 653, 656. 
The only evidence of Century Park's intent in serving the 
Notice to Pay Rent or Quit is the Notice itself and the default 
provision in the lease. There was no testimonial evidence 
presented at trial on the issue and Judge Harding relied solely 
on the documentary evidence in reaching his conclusion. The 
Memorandum Decision (attached as Addendum "An to Appellant's 
Brief) states: "After examination of the default provision in 
the lease and the notice served on defendant, the Court finds 
that plaintiff's intent in serving that notice was only an 
attempt to seek the rent due at that time . . . ." The trial 
court's finding was, in fact, a legal conclusion based on its 
interpretation of the Notice and the default provision on the 
lease without resort to extrinsic evidence. Accordingly, the 
trial court's conclusion of law should be reviewed for 
correctness. 
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But even if this Court finds that a "clearly erroneous11 
standard of review governs in this case, the trial court's 
finding must be reversed. This Court must look to the four 
corners of the two controlling documents, the Notice to Pay Rent 
or Quit and the default provision of the lease agreement, because 
the record contains no other evidence, to determine whether the 
Notice constituted an election of remedies. The documents speak 
for themselves and Bireley is confident that in the alternative 
this Court will conclude that the trial court's decision was 
clearly erroneous. 
POINT II 
THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE UTAH AND 
COLORADO UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTES ARE 
MEANINGLESS IN THIS CONTEXT. 
This Court should adopt the general rule of Colorado that a 
"Notice to Pay or Quit" "constitutes an election by the landlord 
to terminate the lease unless the Notice is rendered ineffective 
by the tenant's payment of rent." Aiqner v. Cowell Sales Co., 
660 P.2d 907, 908 (Colo. 1983). Century Park attempts to dis-
tinguish Aiqner on the basis that the Colorado unlawful detainer 
statute differs from its Utah counterpart. 
The distinctions between the unlawful detainer statutes of 
Colorado and Utah are meaningless in this context. First, there 
is little basis for the proposition that, based solely on that 
state's unlawful detainer statute, the Colorado Supreme Court 
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came to the conclusion that a notice to pay or quit constitutes 
an election of remedies and thereby terminates a lease. Further-
more, both the Colorado and Utah statutes regarding unlawful 
detainer speak in terms of a "forfeiture." 
The general rule recognized in Aigner was first laid out by 
the Colorado Supreme Court in Barlow v. Hoffman, 103 Colo. 286, 
86 P.2d 239 (1938). The applicable lease provisions and demand 
to pay or quit were substantially identical in Aigner and Barlow. 
The Aigner court noted that in Barlow they held that "the 
lessor's notice was 'analogous to a notice which one who is a 
party to any terminable contract gives in order to rescind it at 
law, as distinguished from equity.'" Aigner, 660 P.2d at 909 
(citing Barlow, 103 Colo, at 291, 86 P.2d at 241). The Aigner 
court relied on the rationale of Barlow, and in part, upon the 
unlawful detainer statute, in formulating the general rule 
Bireley asks this Court to adopt. This Court should not be 
dissuaded by the subtle differences between the Utah and Colorado 
statutes because the Aigner court based its decision upon other 
sound principles of law. 
The Colorado unlawful detainer statute cited by the Aigner 
court provides that: "a failure to pay such rent, upon demand, 
whenever made, works a forfeiture." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-
104(1)(d)(1973). The statute also provides for forfeiture of a 
lease under certain conditions. 
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Pursuant to Utah's unlawful detainer statute, a tenant of 
real property is liable for unlawful detainer: 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or 
by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform any 
condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under 
which the property is held, other than those previously 
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the 
alternative the performance of the conditions or cove-
nant or the surrender of the property, served upon him 
and upon any'subtenant in actual occupation of the 
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after 
service. Within three days after the service of the 
notice, the tenant, or any subtenant in actual occupa-
tion of the premises, . • . may perform the condition 
or covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture 
except that if the covenants and conditions of the 
lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be 
performed, then no notice need be given. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(1) (Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). 
According to the Utah statute, the only way to save a lease from 
forfeiture under certain circumstances is to pay the requested 
past-due rent. If the tenant vacates pursuant to a notice to 
perform or surrender the property, the lease agreement is 
forfeited. 
Since the Colorado case law relied on here is not based 
exclusively on the statutory language of Colorado's unlawful 
detainer statute and since Utah's statute also speaks in terms of 
a "forfeiture," there is no reason why this Court should not 
follow the sound reasoning of the Colorado court and hold that 
the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit constituted an election by Century 
Park terminating the lease; and that Bireley is only liable for 
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rent through the date he quit the premises upon receipt of the 
Notice from Century Park. 
POINT III 
SINCE CENTURY PARK FAILED TO GIVE BIRELEY ANY 
INDICATION WHATEVER THAT IT INTENDED TO 
CONTINUE TO HOLD HIM RESPONSIBLE FOR RENT 
AFTER VACATION OF THE PREMISES, BIRELEY1S 
POSSESSORY RIGHT WAS EXTINGUISHED AND THE 
LEASE WAS TERMINATED. 
Century Park gave Bireley no indication whatever that it 
intended to continue to hold him responsible for rent after he 
vacated the premises. The record is bereft of any evidence which 
would indicate Bireley had reason to know he was expected to 
continue to pay rent after being given the alternative to pay or 
quit the premises. He opted to quit and heard nothing from 
Century Park regarding the question of continuing rent until the 
pretrial order was prepared in this case in January of 1990. The 
pretrial order raised the question for the first time. 
If Century Park intended to hold Bireley liable for the full 
term of the lease agreement, Bireley should have had a possessory 
right tr the premises, subject only to Century Park's reasonable 
mitigation efforts. It would be patently unfair to hold that 
Bireley "lost all rights, but retained all obligations of the 
contract." Executive House Bldg., Inc. v. Optimum Systems, Inc., 
311 So.2d 604, 607 (La. App. 1975). Here, Century Park simply 
took back the premises and relet them directly without regard to 
any of Bireleyfs rights. 
-8-
Century Park had an affirmative responsibility to advise 
Bireley, in clear language, that in serving the Notice to Pay 
Rent or Quit it was only attempting to collect rent pursuant to 
notice and that electing to relinquish possession of the property 
did not terminate the lease. Century Park failed to do so. 
The evidence is clear that on or about November 6, 1987, 
Century Park took possession of the leased premises and never 
again offered or conveyed possession to Bireley. Since Century 
Park never gave consideration to Bireley in exchange for his 
alleged obligation to pay rent for the duration of the lease 
term, there is no basis to find the lease was enforceable beyond 
the election to terminate in November, 1987. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision with respect to Century Park's 
intent in serving the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, was a 
conclusion of law to be reviewed for correctness. Bireley 
contends that the trial court was incorrect when it concluded 
that the Notice was only an attempt to seek rent due and not an 
election of remedies. This Court should adopt the Colorado rule 
of Aiqner, which Century Park has failed to meaningfully 
distinguish, and hold as a matter of law that once Century Park 
served Bireley with the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, and once 
Bireley opted to quit and delivered up possession, the lease was 
terminated between the parties. 
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DATED this 2.£^ day of January, 1991. 
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